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Abstract: International investment agreements are foundational instruments in a transnational
investment regime that governs how states regulate the foreign-owned assets and the foreign
investment  activities  of  private  actors.  Over  3,000  investment  agreements  between  states
govern key governmental powers and form the basis for an emerging transnational investment
regime.  This  transnational  regime  significantly  decentralizes,  denationalizes,  and  privatizes
decision-making and policy choices over foreign investment. Investment agreements set limits
to state action in a number of areas of vital public concern, including the protection of human
and  labour  rights,  the  environment,  and  sustainable  development.  They  determine  the
distribution of power between foreign investors and host states and their societies. However,
the societies in which they operate seldom have any input into the terms or operation of these
agreements,  raising  crucial  questions  of  their  democratic  legitimacy  as  mechanisms  of
governance. This paper draws on political science and law to explore the political economy of
international investment agreements and asks whether these agreements are potential vehicles
for promoting international human rights. The analysis provides an historical account of the
investment  regime,  while  a  review  of  the  political  economy  of  international  investment
agreements identifies what appears to be a paradox at the core of their operation. It then
examines  contract  theory  for  insight  into  this  apparent  paradox  and  considers  whether
investment agreements are suitable mechanisms for advancing international human rights.
Keywords: human rights; incomplete contract theory; international arbitration; investor–state 
arbitration
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1. Introduction
Bilateral  and  international  investment  agreements
(BITs/IIAs)  are  foundational  instruments  in  an
increasingly  privatized  transnational  investment
regime  that  governs  how  states  can  regulate  the
foreign-owned  assets  and  the  foreign  investment
activities  of  private  actors.  There  are  over  3,000
agreements that regulate investor–state relations and
that  govern  key  governmental  powers  ([1],  p.  81).
These agreements form the backbone of an emerging
transnational  investment  regime  that  significantly
privatizes, denationalizes, and decentralizes investment
decision-making [2]. In addition, investment protection
is  increasingly  included  in  bilateral  and  multilateral
economic agreements containing investment chapters
and  in  free  trade  agreements,  such  as  the  North
American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA).  This
growing maze of agreements is often described as a
network, although there are no explicit links between
and amongst these arrangements. Rather, it  is  their
shared language, principles, and decision-making and
interpretive  structures  that  underlie  the  network
metaphor and lead to the conclusion that there has
been  a  significant  "treatification  of  international
investment law" ([3], p. 151). 
Investment  agreements  are typically  entered into
between  developed  capital-exporting  states  and
developing  capital-importing  states,  but  increasingly
they are being negotiated between developing states.
They set limits to state action in a number of areas of
vital public concern, including the protection of human
and labour rights, the environment, and sustainable
development.  They  determine  the  distribution  of
power between foreign investors and host states and
their  societies.  However, the societies in which they
operate  seldom  have  any  input  into  the  terms  or
operation of these agreements,  raising crucial ques-
tions of their democratic legitimacy as mechanisms of
governance.  This  paper  draws  upon  insights  from
political  science  and  law  to  develop  a  political
economy  analysis  of  the  investment  regime  and
examines  whether  investment  agreements  are
potential  vehicles for promoting international  human
rights and advancing the democratic legitimacy of the
investor–state  regime.  The  advancement  of  human
rights  through  investment  agreements  faces  major
obstacles  stemming  from  the  nature  of  state
responsibility under international law and the difficulty
of  attaching  legal  duties  to  private  corporations.
However,  this  analysis  suggests  that  there  is  a
growing recognition of  international  corporate social
responsibilities  that  may well  give  rise  to increased
corporate human rights accountability.
The analysis opens with an account of the empirical
incidence  of  international  investment  agreements,
briefly traces their  history in the Post World War II
period, and reviews their politico-legal and economic
functions.  A  review  of  the  political  economy  of
investment agreements identifies what appears to be
a  paradox  at  the  core  of  their  operation.  It  then
examines contract theory for insight into this apparent
paradox.  In  a  review  of  a  few  high-profile  cases
involving  contestation  over  the  right  to  water  and
other  human  rights  the  analysis  considers  whether
investment agreements are analytically and theoretic-
ally  suitable  governance  mechanisms  for  advancing
international human rights. The paper concludes with
discussion of the prospects and challenges of private
transnational  governance through the  investor–state
regime.
2. Investment Arbitration as a Foundation for
International Contracting
International  commercial  arbitration  is  one  of  the
oldest instances of private transnational governance,
dating in historic forms from the medieval ages, and
even earlier [4-7]. Today its roots are associated with
the  medieval  law  merchant  or  lex  mercatoria,  the
private settlement of disputes amongst merchants in
merchant courts and under merchant laws that were
not  enforced  in  local  courts  of  law.  However,  this
association  belies  a  major  distinction  between  the
medieval and modern systems of dispute resolution.
The  medieval  system  of  commercial  arbitration
operated  between  and  amongst  private  actors  and
through private institutions and private law, while the
contemporary  system  of  international  commercial
arbitration involves a mix of public and private actors,
institutions, and processes [8]. The modern regime is
comprised by a system of private commercial arbitral
institutions based upon the  lex mercatoria and by a
public international investor–state system of investor
protection that regulates the way states treat foreign
investment assets and activities. But, importantly, the
latter  investor–state  regime is  modelled  on  the  lex
mercatoria and thus imports many private laws and
standards into inter-state dispute settlement:
Thus,  unlike  international  commercial  arbitration
based  on  rules  of  lex  mercatoria,  the  system of
investor  protection  does  not  resolve  private
disputes or regulate the conduct of private parties.
Rather, the purpose of the system is to limit how
governments  regulate  multinational  enterprises.
For this reason, an investor–state dispute pursuant
to a treaty is an inherently public dispute; one that
involves  the  exercise  of  the  sovereign  power  to
regulate individuals within a state's territory. Even
though the system relies on the model of interna-
tional commercial arbitration and expands private
authority as a method of governance, the system
exists within the realm of public international law—
not international commerce—and it remains tied to
the authority of states. It is states that established
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the system through a series of  treaties that  first
recognized  commercial  arbitration  as  an  interna-
tional institution and then extended the jurisdiction
of  private  arbitration  to  encompass  investment
disputes within the private realm ([9], pp. 604–605).
The importation of private law norms into investor–
state arbitrations brings some symmetry to the two
systems and thus there is a tendency to conflate them
[10].  Further  symmetry  derives  from  the  common
rooting  of  both  systems in  bilateral  or  international
investment treaties (BITs/IIAs). BITs form the core or
central mechanism for the enforcement of contracts in
the global political economy, without which individuals
and corporations would be powerless against states.
They  provide  credible  enforcement  mechanisms,
which were unavailable under international law prior
to  their  adoption.  Moreover,  BITs  and  IIAs  have
significant capacity to oust the jurisdiction of national
courts  of  law  and  to  internationalize  contractual
disputes.  In  many  ways,  BITs  may  be  said  to
constitutionalize  investment  protection  by  providing
for  the  rule  of  law  and  the  normative  core  and
foundation  for  international  contracting  and  the
transnational investment regime [11-13]. It is useful
to  consider  the  distinction  between  governance
through contract  and  governance  by  means  of
contract in order to clarify the various roles played by
investment  agreements.  The former  focuses  on the
regulatory role of the contract in ordering the rights
and  relationships  of  the  parties,  while  the  latter
focuses  on  the  use  of  contract  to  achieve  extra-
contractual  regulatory  or  governance  goals.  An
investment agreement may be analyzed as a form of
governance  through  contract  as  "an  institutional
framework  and  mechanism  of  'self-guidance'  for
private and public parties" ([14], p. 260). As such the
agreement  functions  like  a contract  to  regulate  the
terms of the investment arrangement. In this respect
a  BIT  creates  a  framework  for  the  investor–state
relationship and, as we shall discuss later, provides for
a number of investment protections that structure the
relationship, allocate power and interests between the
state and the investor in particular ways, and provide
for  means  of  dispute  resolution.  In  contrast,  gov-
ernance  by  means  of  a  BIT  directs  attention to its
extra-contractual  function  "as  an  instrument  for
steering behavior and for achieving regulatory goals"
([14],  p.  260).  In  this  way,  investment  agreements
may  be  conceptualized  as  performing  extra-
contractual  roles  in  achieving  public  goals  that  are
extraneous to the parties and international investment
laws. They "fulfil[s] an ordering function for the inter-
national investment relationship and the implementa-
tion of this law may be described as a global public
good" ([15], p. 2). Thus, in theory, investment agree-
ments may be utilized to advance broader social and
political goals, such as liberalization and privatization.
Indeed,  Stephan  Shill  observes  that  investment
treaties "have a constitutional function in providing a
legal framework within which international investment
activities  can  take  shape  and  expand.  As  such,
investment  treaties  are  embedded  in  a  larger
framework  of  international  law  that  overarches  the
individual  bilateral  treaty  relations  and  establishes
uniform  rules  for  the  conduct  of  host  States  that
consist in adopting a liberal attitude vis-à-vis market
mechanisms and that accept the limited role of the
State vis-à-vis the economy" ([16], p. 17).
Others also emphasize that investor–state arbitra-
tion, while modelled on the private law of commercial
transactions, is  "not  merely another form of private
law commercial arbitration, with one party now being
a state, but…is more fittingly understood as a form of
dispute settlement that…also operates in a public law
context" ([17], p. 285). 
However, the tendency to conflate the private and
public  dimensions  of  dispute  resolution raises  some
very  interesting  questions.  Are  international  invest-
ment agreements to be regarded as treaties governed
by  principles  of  international  law  or  as  contracts
governed by contract law? Noemi Gal-Or explores this
ambiguity in the context of international agreements
that  provide  for  investor–state  arbitration,  arguing
that on one hand they are treaties, but on the other
hand they contain "elements of a state-private party
contract"  ([18],  p.  215).  If  considered  a  contract,
whose contract law applies—that of the investor, the
host,  or  delocalized,  transnational  contract  law?  To
what extent are BITs subject to the same third party
limitations imposed by theories of privity of contract?
What  are  the  appropriate  interpretive  techniques?
What mechanisms govern intervention by non-parties
in arbitration proceedings or access to documents, the
publication of arbitral awards, or appeal proceedings?
The importation of private law norms into a public law
arena  thus  poses  serious  governance  challenges.
However,  before  considering  these  more  fully,  it  is
necessary to consider how and why investment arbit-
ration forms a fundamental constitutional foundation
for the transnational investment regime. This involves
an  examination of  the  history  of  the  investor–state
regime and the nature and operation of international
investment agreements as essential mechanisms of a
private transnational regulatory regime.
3. History and Function of the Investor Protec-
tion Regime
Historically,  disputes  over  foreign  investment  were
settled  by  force  and "gunboat  diplomacy"  ([19],  p.
780).  However,  by  the  nineteenth  century  colonial
powers entered into treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and  Navigation  (FCN  treaties).  While  FCN  treaties
were not  directed specifically  at  foreign investment,
but  were  drafted  to  encourage  international  trade,
they  did  offer  some  protection  for  the  assets  of
foreigners  [20].  Over-time  greater  protections  were
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included  in  these  treaties,  although  they  did  not
provide  for  direct  dispute  resolution  by  investors
against host states. Foreign investors essentially had
two  options  if  their  investment  was  somehow
impaired by  the host  state.  The doctrine  governing
international legal personality identifies states as the
primary  subjects  of  international  law  and  generally
does not allow an individual or corporation to take a
legal action against a state [21]. As a consequence,
foreign  investors  had  to  rely  on  diplomacy  and
political  influence  in  order  to  persuade  their  home
state to  advance a legal  claim on their  behalf.  The
alternative was to initiate a claim in the national court
of the host state under national law. Neither option
proved to be satisfactory for the foreign investors; the
first  did  not  guarantee  compensation,  while  the
second rarely resulted in their success ([19], p. 781).
Nor did the rules of customary international law provide
for the right of a foreign investor to make  monetary
transfers from the host state or to bring in personnel to
operate  their  investments,  while  the  standards
governing compensation were ill-defined [22].
After  World  War  II  the  United  States  began
incorporating  investment  protections  into  its  FCN
treaties.  The  United  States  supported  what  was
known  as  the  "Hull  Rule",  articulated  by  American
Secretary  of  State,  Cordell  Hull,  in  a  note  to  the
Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  concerning
compensation due upon the Mexican expropriation of
foreign-owned  agrarian  and oil  properties.  The Hull
Rule  describes  the  standard  of  compensation  due
under  customary  international  law  as  "prompt,  ad-
equate, and effective" compensation. However, while
supported  by  the  developed  world,  this  rule  was
challenged in the post World War II period by devel-
oping countries who were emerging as independent
states during decolonization. The wave of nationaliza-
tions  and  expropriations  (direct  takings)  without
compensation that took place during this time led to
the erosion of  the rule  as a  principle  of  customary
international law. Mexico rejected the rule, as too did
the Soviet Union and other Latin American countries.
These  states  engaged  in  massive  expropriations
without  compensation.  Jeswald  Salacuse  observes
that the average number of nationalizations of foreign
investor property rose steadily from about fifteen per
year in 1960 to over fifty a year in 1975 ([2], p. 435,
note 42).
During  this  time  the  United  Nations  General
Assembly  (UNGA)  was  the  focus  of  developing
countries  claims  for  a  New  International  Economic
Order.  The  1962  UNGA  Resolution  on  Permanent
Sovereignty  Over  Natural  Resources  articulated  the
standard of compensation as appropriate compensa-
tion in accord with the laws of the host state and by
the mid 1970s the rule had ceased to have the status
of customary international law ([23], p. 641). This left
the law governing foreign investment uncertain, with
capital exporting states advancing the Hull Rule, and
capital importing states rejecting it in a standoff.
International  investment  agreements  emerged  as
the  solution  to  this  uncertainty  in  the  late  1960s,
although the first BIT was entered into before this in
1959 between West Germany and Pakistan  and later
Japan in 1977, and the United States in 1982 ([23], p.
653). They are "based on the presumption that the
guarantees  provided  to  foreign  investors  by  the
domestic legal system of the host country may be—or
may  turn  out  to  be—insufficient  for  the  special
purpose intended by those treaties, which is primarily
the  creation  of  an  investment  climate  designed  to
attract  the  foreign  investment  desired  by  the  host
state" ([24], p. 954).
The  International  Centre  for  the  Settlement  of
Investment  Disputes  (ICSID)  was  created  in  1966
under  the  auspices  of  the  World  Bank  to  provide
investors with the institutional  framework for taking
direct legal action under a BIT against host states. At
first the developing countries were unwilling to use it
and ICSID only heard its first case in 1972 ([2],  p.
439). However, the pace of BIT signing picked up and
saw vast expansion by the 1990s, leading to today's
situation  where  investor–state  arbitrations  occur
regularly  under  the  auspices  of  ICSID  and  NAFTA
Chapter 11.
The development of this investor–state regime and
the  steady  global  expansion  of  international  invest-
ment  agreements  are  thus  due  to  a  number  of
geopolitical,  economic,  institutional,  and  ideological
developments  [25].  But  how  do  these  agreements
function and why do they form an essential part of
the emerging private transnational regulatory order?
As noted earlier, BITs provide direct legal access for
foreign investors against host states without having to
go  to  national  courts,  bypassing  the  exhaustion  of
local remedies. In providing for investor–state arbitra-
tion  BITs  give  "private  persons  and  companies  the
right to compel a sovereign state to appear before a
tribunal  and defend  its  sovereign actions  ostensibly
taken to protect the public interest" ([2], p. 460). This
has  been  described  as  a  "revolutionary  innovation"
that has caused a "paradigm shift" in and "profound
transformation"  of  international  law,  which  was
unprecedented ([26],  p. 46, note 175).  Even in the
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO),  which  possesses
one  of  the  most  developed  dispute  settlement
systems, private actors do not have legal standing—
only states may bring actions. Salacuse notes of these
important developments:
Thus the global investment regime has granted a
private right of action to investors. It has thereby
privatized the decision-making process to a large
extent. Not only are private parties involved as lit-
igants, but also as arbitrators—the decision makers
in  the  process—who  are  private  persons  com-
pensated by the disputants, not officials of govern-
ments or international organizations ([2], p. 460).
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But,  in  addition  to  the  privatization  of  dispute
resolution  under  investor–state  proceedings,  the
process  has  been  transnationalized  by  significantly
delocalizing  and  denationalizing  its  institutional
context,  procedures,  and  substantive  law.  The  now
classic definition of transnational relations articulated
by  Robert  Keohane  and  Joseph  Nye  is  "regular
interactions across national boundaries when at least
one  actor  is  a  non-state  actor"  ([27],  pp.  xii–xvi).
While  influential,  this  definition  of  transnationalism
obscures the important insight that the transnational
is not a territorially defined physical space existing at
some level above the state, but is constituted within
states  where legislation,  such as  that  implementing
the  New  York  Convention  on  the  Enforcement  of
Foreign  Arbitral  Awards,  legislation  limiting  national
judicial review of foreign arbitral awards, or legislation
and policies permitting the waiver of the exhaustion of
local remedies rule, enable private actors to operate in
a  deterritorialized  and  denationalized  legal  space.  I
have  elsewhere  argued  that  the  transnational  is,
ontologically  and  epistemologically,  not  a  level  of
analysis, distinct from the national or domestic levels,
but rather "extends across and thereby links as well
as  transcends,  different  (territorial)  levels"  [28].
Moreover,  it  links  local  and  global  orders  through
privatized processes of dispute resolution. Alec Sweet
Stone goes to great lengths to emphasize the funda-
mental  difference  between  the  transnational  invest-
ment regime as fundamentally distinct as a "private
transnational space" from that of the European Union,
which  he  characterizes  as  a  "public  supranational
space" constructed by states ([29], p. 628).
Importantly, most BITs provide general consent to
delocalized, binding arbitration, unlike specific consent
in  a  contract  to  arbitrate  where the  parties  will  be
governed by the domestic rules of contract under the
applicable system of private international law/conflicts
of law. Gus Van Harten [9]  identifies three ways in
which  a  state  may  consent  to  the  compulsory
arbitration of future investment disputes: by contract
with  an  investor  containing  a  binding  arbitration
clause;  by  legislation  that  provides  for  compulsory
arbitration  of  investment  disputes  within  a  state's
territory;  and  by  treaty  providing  for  compulsory
investor–state  arbitration.  The  latter  two  provide
general  consent,  while  the  first  provides  specific
consent to disputes arising out of the contract.
The notion of general consent signaled a profound
shift in the nature and consequences of investor–
state  arbitration.  A  general  consent  by  the  host
state  allows  investors  to  initiate  compulsory
arbitration of an investment dispute in the absence
of a contractual relationship between the investor
and the state. Thus disputes about the regulatory
authority  of  the  state  are  brought  within  the
jurisdiction  of  international  arbitration  tribunals.
Policy questions regarding the exercise of govern-
mental powers are resolved, at the instance of the
investors,  by  private  arbitrators  whose  decisions
are insulated from review by public courts (whether
domestic or international). In this way, the general
consent to investor–state arbitration is the concep-
tion of the system of investor protection as an in-
strument of transnational governance ([9], p. 607).
The  general  consent  given  by  a  host  state  "is
general  because  it  authorizes the arbitration of  any
future dispute with any foreign investor [of the state
party] in the states territory" ([9], p. 607). In this way
a  general  consent  in  an  investment  agreement
operates like "blank cheque which may be cashed for
an unknown amount at a future and as yet unknown
date"  ([9],  p.  607).  In  so  doing  it  "transforms
investor–state  arbitration  from  a  modified  form  of
commercial  arbitration  into  a  system to  control  the
states exercise of regulatory authority with respect to
investors as a group" ([9], p. 608).
The  requirement  to  exhaust  local  remedies  is  a
traditional rule of international law and requires that a
natural or legal person must first have recourse to all
means of redress available in the domestic law of the
host state before bringing a claim against that state in
an international forum. However, for ICSID proceed-
ings states agree in advance on the basis of provisions
of  the  ICSID Convention to  refrain  from requesting
that  local  remedies  be  pursued  for  investment
arbitrations arising out of leases, concessions or other
contracts governed by the investment treaty. In return
the  home  start  agrees  not  to  grant  diplomatic
protection of its nationals. This in effect suspends the
operation of local laws and "lifts individuals onto the
international plane vis-à-vis the host state" ([24], p.
957).  The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are silent  on
the matter.
BITs differ in their treatment of the exhaustion of
local remedies rule: only a few BITs concluded since
1985 provide for the application of the rule prior to
arbitration under the BIT ([30], p. 50). Jan Paulsson
notes  that  some  BITs  contain  the  requirement  to
exhaust  local  remedies  for  a  period  of  time,  while
others  do  not,  indirectly  waiving  the  requirement
([31], p. 240). Romanian BITs typically articulate the
rule, as too does the Germany–Israel BIT, whereas the
Australia–Czechoslovakia BIT states that local remed-
ies  need  not  be  exhausted.  Some BITs  provide for
arbitration if the dispute has not been settled through
local means after a certain amount of time, as in the
Argentina–German BIT. Also, some BITs articulate a
fork in the road provision whereby once a particular
dispute settlement route has been chose it forecloses
electing another route, reflecting the Latin maxim via
electa non datur recursus as alteram: "Once a road is
chosen, there is no recourse to the other" ([30], p. 51).
A study of 148 German BITs reveals that the majority
explicitly waive the local remedies rule, many do not
even raise it, and only three require the exhaustion of
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local  remedies  ([30],  p.  52).  From  2000  onward
Germany, who has the highest number of BITs in force,
has explicitly waived the rule in German BITs [30].
The  general  consent  feature  of  an  investment
treaty  thus  "exposes  a  state  to  a  broad  range  of
claims  by  a  foreign  investor  related  to  the  states
exercise of public authority. These investment treaties,
which  initially  were aimed at  reducing an investor's
risk of investing abroad, have now been transformed
into tools with which to assail an extensive range of
host states governmental activity" ([19], p. 782). 
An  investment  agreement  will  generally  contain
three elements: definitions, substantive obligations for
host states, and provisions for binding investor–state
dispute  resolution.  Breaches  of  BITs  constitute
breaches of international law and the protections for
investors are much stronger and broader than those
under  the  Hull  Rule.  Whereas  the  Hull  Rule  mainly
addressed  direct  expropriations,  today  it  is  takings,
short  of  expropriation  that  most  often  engage
arbitrators ([23], p. 644). "Investment" is defined in
most treaties, such as the Model US BIT, to include a
broad range of  agreements as investment and thus
governed by the BIT. A broadly defined BIT can bring
under  its  jurisdiction  many  types  of  contracts  and
subject them to delocalized arbitration even when the
terms  are  silent  on  the  matter  ([32],  p.  76).  Also
"umbrella  clauses"  may  be  used  which  create  the
possibility of bringing all contractual arrangements the
state may enter into with the foreign investor under
the  investment  treaty,  thereby  transforming  the
breach of any contract entered into between the state
and  investor  into  a  breach  of  their  BIT.  There  is
considerable doctrinal and jurisprudential debate over
the  operation  of  these  clauses,  which  has  been
described as one of  the most contentious issues of
international  investment  law  ([33],  p.  5).  They  are
regarded as reflecting the desire to delocalize the law
applying to international contracts:
The emergence of the clause in modern investment
protection  treaties  must  be  seen  in  the  broader
context  of  efforts  to  internationalize  the  legal
framework  applicable  to  international  concession
contracts.  Whereas many capital  importing coun-
tries used to emphasize the exclusive applicability
of their domestic legislation to concession contracts
concluded  with  foreign  investors,  various  efforts
have been made to withdraw these contracts from
the unilateral  regulatory  power  of  the host  state
([24], p. 965).
However,  Rudolf  Dolzer  also  notes  that  the
internationalization and delocalization of a contract by
a BIT is complicated and depends on the nature of
the breach as a contract breach or a treaty breach, as
well  as  whether  the  contract  provides  for  exclusive
national court jurisdiction for breach of contract. The
first case to consider this was Lanco International Inc.
v.  The  Argentine  Republic [34].  There  an  ICSID
arbitration  tribunal  held  that  consent  to  arbitration
under  the  BIT  prevailed  over  a  provision  in  the
concession contract for the submission of disputes to
local courts. Andrew Guzman argues that "by making
any  breach  of  an  agreement  a  violation  of  an
international treaty…BITs allow such agreements to be
treated as contracts between private parties…" ([23],
p.  655),  internationalizing  the  contract.  However,
Francisco Vicuña rejects that the internationalization
of  a  contract  turns  it  into  a  treaty—it  just  brings
treaties and contracts into a closer nexus and subjects
the latter to international law: "treaties and contracts,
albeit different, pursue the same objective of ensuring
the  rule  of  law  and  the  observance  of  legal
commitments in the international community and are
thus  called  to  increasing  interaction.  To  this  end,
treaties are becoming privatized by allowing a greater
role for individuals in their operation, just as contracts
are  becoming  public  to  the  extent  that  states  and
international  law  extend  their  guarantees  to  their
observance.  All  of  it  points  towards  the  need  for
global protection in a global society, where perhaps
the  distinction  between  public  and  private  law  will
become less meaningful" ([35], p. 357).
In addition to providing definitions of investment,
the  typical  BIT  will  establish  general  standards  of
behavior  of  the  host  state.  The common standards
include "fair and equitable treatment", "full protection
and  security",  "national  treatment",  "most-favored-
nation treatment", and "treatment in accordance with
international  law". The BIT will  also include specific
standards concerning the investment, such as dealing
with monetary transfers, expropriation, investor rights
during war, revolution or civil unrest. The BIT rarely
states specific consequences of a breach, but arbitra-
tion tribunals have held uniformly that compensation
is due upon breaches resulting in injury on the basis
of customary international law ([2], p. 446). 
Finally, the BIT will provide for a binding enforce-
ment  mechanism  for  investors  and  will  often
designate the arbitration institutions and rules to be
adopted.  Andrew Guzman observes  that  "BITs offer
foreign investors greater protection than the Hull Rule
ever did…by providing a mechanism through which a
potential investor and a potential host can establish a
contract that is binding under international law" ([23],
p.  658),  which  was  not  possible  under  customary
international law. Absent a BIT, a state is not able to
credibly bind itself to an investor: domestic law is not
a credible option as the laws may be changed and
there is no guarantee of a fair hearing, while there are
virtually  no  mechanisms  for  securing  contractual
promises  between  a  state  and  private  firm  under
international  law,  as  noted  earlier.  Binding  dispute
resolution through international arbitration thus allows
foreign  investors  to  sue host  states  directly  if  they
believe that the investment agreement governing their
investment has been violated. BITs thus revolutionize
contractual  enforcement.  In  fact,  investor–state
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arbitration is described by Jan Paulsson as "not a sub-
genre  of  an  existing  discipline.  It  is  dramatically
different  from  anything  previously  known  in  the
international  sphere"  ([31],  p.  256).  Another  notes
that this delocalization produces a democratic deficit:
State  parties  to  investment  agreements  can  no
longer legislate at will in the public interest without
concern that an arbitral tribunal will determine that
the legislation constitutes interference with an in-
vestment. Thus investment arbitration may result in
an overall  loss of  state independence and sover-
eignty, which has implications for democratic gov-
ernance  (…)  The  question  arises  whether  state
exercises of public authority should be adjudicated by
foreigners, largely on the basis of commercial prin-
ciples, when the adjudicators are unconcerned  with
the wider effects of their decisions ([19], p. 799).
Investor–state arbitral proceedings differ so funda-
mentally from adjudication in courts of law that many
question  the  formers  adequacy  in  settling  disputes
that raise public interest issues. Questions concerning
the independence and impartiality of private arbitrat-
ors,  limited  public  access  to the  arbitral  documents,
proceedings,  and  awards,  the  absence  of  appeal
mechanisms, and the application of private commercial
law standards and conceptions to public law issues are
some of the more serious defects in process that invite
criticisms  of  the  democratic  deficit  and  undemocratic
supremacy of governance through arbitration [18,19].
Specialists note an epistemological divide between
international  commercial  lawyers and public interna-
tional lawyers that creates conflicting approaches to
investor–state  arbitration.  "Even  though  public  and
private law perspectives mostly merge in investment
treaty  arbitrations,  there  remains  a  divide  in  the
conceptual frameworks of the private and public law
perspectives  and  in  the  epistemic  communities  of
commercial  arbitration  and  public  international
lawyers" ([36], p. 10). Moreover, regulatory competi-
tion  amongst  states  for  foreign  investment  in  the
1980s and 1990s resulted in the legislation of limits
on judicial interference with foreign arbitral awards by
many states. Belgium in 1985 removed any oversight
of  foreign  awards  by  Belgian  courts  and  has  been
criticized  for  bowing  to  competitive  pressures  to
become more attractive investment site ([9], p. 617).
Competitive  pressures  have  also  generated  forum
shopping  by  investors  for  the  states  that  offer  the
most  attractive  investment  regimes.  This  is  said  to
contribute  to  governance  gaps,  as  noted  by  John
Ruggie,  former  Special  Representative  of  the  UN
Secretary General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations:
Investor  protections  have  expanded  with  little
regard  to  States  duties  to  protect,  skewing  the
balance  between  the  two.  Consequently,  host
states can find it  difficult  to strengthen domestic
social and environmental standards, including those
related to human rights,  without fear  of  foreign-
investor  challenge,  which  can  take  place  under
binding international arbitration ([37], p. 29).
Indeed, while this section has reviewed the history
of the investor protection regime and the emergence
of  investment  treaties  as  central  institutions  in
providing for  the stability  of  investment relations,  it
notes  that  these  agreements  also  raise  concerns
about their impact on state autonomy and the broader
democratic  legitimacy  of  the  investor–state  legal
regime.  Indeed,  Stephan  Schill  argues  that  clauses
that limit  state legislative and policy  autonomy,  like
umbrella  and  stabilization  clauses,  function  to
privately  order  investor–state  relations  precisely  by
preventing  states  from  pursuing  opportunistic
behaviour that might present itself over the course of
a long-term contract [33]. These clauses highlight the
tensions  between the  investors'  interest  in  securing
investment against future political risks and the host
states interest in ensuring adequate policy autonomy
in the face of  changing circumstances  or unanticip-
ated developments not addressed in the agreements.
Such concerns have led some to question why states
would agree to bind their legislative and policy inde-
pendence into the future.  The following section will
examine this question and will  consider the insights
afforded by theories of incomplete contracts into the
political economy of investment agreements. It argues
that although governance through BITs raises signific-
ant  governance  gaps,  BITs  also  create  distinctive
political  economies  that  have  implications  for  the
advancement of development and human rights.
4. The Political Economy of Investment Agree-
ments and Contract Theory
The President of Bolivia once stated that in investor–
state arbitrations Latin American developing countries
"never win the cases. The transnationals always win"
([38], p. 436). In a review of allegations of the sys-
temic bias of the arbitral  system against developing
countries,  Susan  Franck  notes  that  Nicaragua  pro-
motes  withdrawal  from  ICSID,  while  Ecuador  is
eliminating  investment  arbitration  ([38],  pp.  436–
437). Venezuela has renounced the ICSID Convention
[39].  These  developments  are  not  surprising,  given
the well-known fact that the system is a product of an
alliance between a multinational investment lobby and
central capital exporting states and is clearly weighted
in favour of investor protection. ICSID is a creation of
the  World  Bank  whose  weighted  voting  system
favours powerful developed states. The investor–state
regime allocates power between foreign investors and
the host state, creating political economies that result
in  significant  distributional  outcomes.  A  number  of
people  have  identified  a  paradox  for  developing
countries at the heart of the system. Salacuse asks:
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"why do developing countries, who usually have few
national investors in need of protection abroad, sign
investment  treaties  whose  effect  is  to restrain  their
own  governments  in  their  dealings  with  foreign  in-
vestors?" ([2], p. 440). Note that BITs do not impose
duties on foreign investors and nor do they give the
host  state  the  capacity  to  sue  the  foreign  investor
([40], p. 499). While the ICSID Convention has given
rise to a few claims made by states, they are regarded
as  anomalous  ([41],  p.  101).  Indeed,  the  lopsided
nature of the investor protection regime has prompted
some to conclude that it distorts the balance between
public and private authority:
(…) the one-sided nature of the dispute settlement
system, in which only private investors may initiate
a  claim  and  only  states  must  pay  damages,
privileges private property and contract rights over
the  public  interest.  It  creates  a  system of  third-
party beneficiaries, making the regime more rigid.
It promotes private rights and relegates states to
defensive  status.  BITs  thus  collapse  the  public/
private binary and shift the boundary between the
public good and private interests by privatizing part
of  the  public.  This  re-conceptualization  limits  the
influence of public concepts traditionally considered
part  of  the  state  such  as  human  rights,  the
environment, and democracy ([40], p. 519).
The proliferation of BITs entered into by developing
states that provide much greater protection for for-
eign investors than the Hull Rule ever did appear to
be incongruous, if not contradictory with their earlier
rejection of the Hull Rule. Some suggest that develop-
ing countries may in fact be better off under custom-
ary international law than under BITs ([42], p. 615).
M. Sornarajah ([43], p. 259; [44], p. 90) refers to this
contradiction  as  "duplicitous",  while  Guzman  poses
the question even more provocatively, in a paper en-
titled "Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them" [23]. 
Various  international  relations  and  political  eco-
nomy  theories  may  be  advanced  to  explain  the
position  adopted  by  developing  countries  and  to
account for the nature and operation of the investor–
state  regime.  Hegemonic  stability  theory  draws  on
neorealist  theories  and  posits  that  international
regimes  will  arise  when  they  are  promoted  and
enforced  by  a  powerful  state.  However,  this  theory
clearly  provides a blunt analytical  instrument  for  no
single  hegemonic  state  has  advanced  the  investor–
state regime and it does not explain why developing
countries  would  join,  despite  their  rejection  of  Hull
Rule ([2], p. 433). Theories of international cooperation
and  international  contracting  based  upon  liberal
foundations  in  rational  choice  theory,  transaction-
coast  analysis,  and  theories  of  collective  goods
provide  some  insight  [45].  They  suggest  that  the
regime  advances  the  interests  of  all  parties  by
reducing  the  relative  costs  of  investing—capital-
exporting states reduce their enforcement costs and
the  risk  of  default  (expropriation,  etc.).  Capital-
importing  states  wish  to  attract  foreign  investment
and so enter into agreements to reduce the perceived
risk of default and to enhance their competitive edge
against other capital-importing states. 
In fact, BITs have been described as "quintessen-
tially  liberal  documents.  The  typical  BIT  cites  two
goals  in  its  preamble:  the  creation  of  favorable
conditions for investment by nationals and companies
of  one  party  in  the  territory  of  the  other,  and
increased  prosperity  in  both  states"  ([46],  p.  627).
While  challenged  by  economic  nationalists  and
Marxists, who regard foreign investment agreements
to be overwhelmingly of disproportionate and declin-
ing benefit  over-time to  the  foreign investor,  liberal
analysts argue that the parties gain mutually (but not
necessarily  equally)  under  investment  agreements
when they are based upon the comparative advant-
ages of the parties ([46], p. 624). According to liberal
theory,  BITs thus operate to protect  the investment
from state interference, to "insulate the market from
politics", and to encourage foreign investment in the
host  state,  who limits  its  role  to "protecting private
rights  of  property  and  contract",  thereby  producing
efficient exchange ([46], pp. 623–624; see [47,48]).
As Elkins, Guzman and Simmons find, "the prolifer-
ation of BITs—and the liberal property rights regime
they embody—is propelled in good part by the com-
petition  among potential  host  countries  for  credible
property  rights  protections  that  direct  investors
require" ([49],  p.  812).  But we know that BITs are
tilted  in  favour  of  the  capital-exporter  and  do  not
benefit all parties equally, so this still does not address
the paradox of why the capital-importer would agree
to a one-sided bargain. 
The  theory  of  limited  contracting  provides  useful
insight into the political  economy of BITs. "Contract
theory is  primarily an analytical approach to explain
why parties enter into contracts in the first place and
why they write the contracts that they do, in light of
what courts do. It also helps to answer questions of
optimal contracting" ([50], p. 515). Liberal economic
theory of contract assumes that parties to a contract
act rationally and desire to enter into agreements that
optimize their benefits both at the time of contracting
and in the future. However, the future poses problems
of  uncertainty  that  can  affect  the  distribution  of
benefits under the contract ([51], p. 280). Inspired by
the  work  of  Oliver  Wiliamson [52],  limited  contract
theory  analyzes  the  power  structure  of  contractual
relationships.  Incomplete  contracts  are  forms  of
relational  contracting  where  the  contract  operates
over a period of time and incompletely specifies the
performance  obligations.  They  are  contrasted  with
discrete  contracts,  the  latter  being  fully  specified
([48],  pp.  140–141).  The theory  of  limited contract
suggests  that  over  time  in  situations  of  asset
specificity  there  will  be  an incentive for  one of  the
parties to delay or in some way hold up performance
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under  the  contract.  As  Robert  Scott  puts  it,  "the
investing party (…) risks being held up by a promisor
(…)  who  can  renege  on  his  promise  and  force  a
renegotiation  of  the  contract.  This  threat  will  be
credible  if  the  (…)  investment  cannot  be  used  for
other  purposes  outside  the  relationship  (…)  [T]he
sunk costs will  increase the risk that the Buyer will
threaten to walk away from the deal unless the Seller
[investor]  agrees  to  renegotiate  the  initial  contract
terms" ([51], p. 284).
When applied to international relations, incomplete
contracting  theory  identifies  a  paradox  that  bears
some likeness to the paradox identified in this paper
concerning  the  entry  of  developing  countries  into
investment agreements that impose far greater limits
on their sovereignty than those imposed by the Hull
Rule. States highly desire to protect their sovereignty,
but regularly enter into agreements that limit it, such
as the Treaty of Rome that created the EEC [53]. This
seems at odds with the general anarchic character of
international relations and uncertainty about the long-
term implications and distributional consequences of
agreements limiting their sovereignty. The absence of
some sort of centralized enforcement mechanism to
ensure  that  the  parties  honour  their  commitments
also  suggests  that  states  will  avoid  such  arrange-
ments.  However,  BITs  have proliferated in  both  the
developed and developing worlds.
(…) incomplete contracting theory can clarify how
and  why  states  choose  to  bundle  and  unbundle
their sovereignty, what the dynamics will likely be
of future renegotiation, why some of these incom-
plete contracts might unravel (…) Theories of in-
complete contracting are particularly instructive for
explaining  the  organizational  boundaries  of  the
international system (…) The lack of a central gov-
erning authority ensures that states must be wary
of  the  long-term  distributional  consequences  of
their  actions and be hesitant  to commit  to long-
term agreements (…) In such an environment in-
complete contracts offer two important advantages
for  states.  First,  incomplete  contracts  delineate
general principles and broad goals to which states
can  aspire  (…)  Second,  contractual  renegotiation
acts  as  an  important  institutional  check  on  the
future behavior of actors (…) Incomplete contracts
also  offer  added  flexibility  to  correct  for
distributional  asymmetries  that  may  arise  as  the
result of the initial agreement. In short, incomplete
contracts  between  states  are  framework  agree-
ments  that  do  not  fully  apportion  sovereignty.
Instead such agreements make the distribution and
allocation of sovereign rights a matter of on-going
negotiation  between  the  contracting  parties  or
between those parties and a third party, such as a
supranational organization ([53], pp. 5–6).
Incomplete contracts are used by states in condi-
tions  involving  variety  of  uncertainties  and  transac-
tions costs that prevent states from entering into fully
specified  agreements.  There  are  procedural  reasons
arising from uncertainty  costs  (inability  of  states  to
anticipate all future contingencies), negotiating costs
(information limitations that prevent the negotiation of
optimal agreements), and enforcement costs (inability
to negotiate an enforcement mechanism). There are
also  strategic  reasons  for  negotiating  incomplete
contracts.  In  cases  where  the  contract  governs
specific assets and the transactions are frequent the
owner  of  the  assets  will  have  strategic  reasons  in
order to extract more benefits under the agreement
later in time. As Cooley and Spruyt note "[i]n certain
cases of incomplete contracting, such as contracting
over natural resource use, the host country tends to
gain more leverage as the foreign country (investor)
sinks  more  transaction-specific  assets  into  such
exploitation" ([53], p. 11).
Drawing  an  analogy  between  an  investment
agreement as an incomplete contract, we may analyze
BITs  as  incomplete  contracts  between  states  [54].
Indeed, Anne van Aaken argues that BITs "may be
interpreted as mechanisms to overcome commitment
problems between investor and host state in order to
generate  mutual  benefits.  A  state  thereby promises
not to infringe on the property rights of foreign direct
investors so as to attract more investment" ([50], p.
509). She suggests that in terms of law, BITs may be
conceptualized as contracts in favour of third parties
([50], p. 520). Host states thus trade off some sover-
eignty  for  credibility  by  restricting  their  regulatory
capacities  and  agreeing  to  submit  to  compulsory
binding arbitration. In the case of the BIT, sovereignty
is apportioned between the host state, the foreign in-
vestor, and the designated binding arbitration tribunal.
The challenge, however, is for the parties to strike the
right balance between commitment and flexibility—too
much commitment can reduce flexibility and the ability
to  adjust  to  changing  circumstances  that  alter  the
distribution of the benefits and costs of the agreement.
As  mentioned  already,  incomplete  contracting
theory  indicates  that  the  incentive  structure  and
distribution of benefits changes over the course of a
contractual  relationship.  Incomplete  contracts  "alter
the  relative  bargaining  positions  and  change  the
distribution  of  benefits  to  contracting  parties  over
time" and importantly, "the holder of residual rights of
control will be able to determine the future allocation
of sovereign rights that were not covered in the initial
agreement" ([53], p. 11). Guzman argues that while
BITs  may  reduce  the  overall  welfare  of  developing
states,  the  competitive  pressures  to  attract  foreign
investment create an incentive structure that encour-
ages  the  negotiation  of  significant  concessions  to
foreign investors at the onset of the relationship [23].
The  absence  of  a  credible  contracting  mechanism
dictates that host states agree to binding dispute set-
tlement and the various standards that are common-
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place  in  the  usual  BIT.  At  this  point  the  foreign
investor  is  in  the  driver's  seat.  However,  once  the
investment is made, the host state no longer has to
offer incentives to attract new investment, but now is
concerned about keeping the existing investment. At
this point the host gains power in the relationship and
is  in  a  position  to  extract  benefits  from  the  foreign
investor through tax increases or other policy measures.
Raymond Vernon describes the plight of the foreign
investor as an "obsolescing bargain" because of the
decline in the bargaining power of the foreign investor
during  the  course  of  the  investment  ([55],  p.  46).
Once  the  investment  has  been  made  the  investor
cannot easily move its assets without incurring major
costs.  For  these  reasons  parties  often  include
renegotiation  and  stabilization  clauses,  but  these
clearly open the relationship up to conflicts of interest
between  the  host  state  and  the  foreign  investor.
Incomplete contracting theory also suggests that an
important variable in determining who holds power in
a  contractual  relationship  is  the  party  who  retains
ownership rights in  the residual  assets.  Drawing on
the work of  Oliver Hart  [56],  David Lake addresses
the  power  significance  of  the  "locus  of  rights  of
residual control":
(…) contracts vary in both their specificity and the
rights  of  residual  control  possessed  by  each
member; indeed, the latter is the defining attribute
of  relational  hierarchy  (…)  In  constructing  con-
tracts,  states  are  defining  the  terms  of  their
transactions; the potential for cheating, defection,
and other  forms of  opportunism; and the means
for  controlling  one  anothers  behavior.  In  this
approach, contracts are instruments through which
to control the behavior of others ([57], p. 10).
Host states, by retaining residual property rights in
the investment are, in theory, able to exert pressure
on  the  foreign  investor  to  extract  further  benefits
under the BIT. However,  BITs also provide for com-
pulsory  binding  arbitration,  suggesting  that  residual
rights  have  been  transferred,  at  least  in  some
measure, to a third party [58]. Thus the ability of the
host state to hold up the agreement might be limited
in important ways by the outcome of arbitral proceed-
ings.  Tribunals  differ  in  the strictness in which they
interpret  the  provisions  of  BITs, with  ICSID  being
known for strict interpretations ([50], p. 528). However,
other tribunals can be more generous in their inter-
pretation  of  substantive  BIT  provisions.  Thus  third
party involvement inserts further uncertainty into the
agreement and might well open up a governance gap
that  functions  as  a  window  of  opportunity  for  the
advancement  of  extra-contractual  objectives  in  the
investment  relationship,  such  as  the  promotion  of
human  rights.  To  what  extent  can  BITs  create
opportunities for the advancement of human rights?
5. BITs and the Advancement of Human Rights
Human  rights  may  enter  into  the  investor–state
relationship in a variety of ways. They may be raised
by the foreign investor in a claim or as a defence to a
claim under a BIT. They may also be put in issue by
the host state or utilized by arbitrators as construction
aids  in  interpreting  the  provisions  of  a  BIT.  Finally,
human rights may be expressly  incorporated into a
BIT. Each will be considered in turn.
Corporations and individual investors are entitled to
human rights protections under a number of regional
and international  human rights  treaties.  Specifically,
the protections afforded by the European Convention
on Human Rights in cases taken before the European
Court of Human Rights has been a significant venue
for investor claims, in addition to claims being made
before  arbitrations  under  the  relevant  BITs  ([59],
p.  23,  note  44).  Arbitrators  have  looked  to  the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
Human  Rights  in  Mondev  v.  United  States  [60],  a
NAFTA  Chapter  11  claim  by  a  Canadian  investor
against  the United States Government to  the effect
that  the  US  courts  had  violated  his  rights  under
international  law.  The  Tribunal  held  that  decisions
from  the  European  Court  "provide  guidance  by
analogy" concerning the scope of NAFTA's guarantee
of  "treatment  in  accordance  with  international  law,
including  fair  and  equitable  treatment  and  full
protection and security" ([60], para. 144). In Tecmed
v. Mexico  [61], a case involving a Mexican refusal to
renew a permit to operate a landfill site near an urban
centre,  precipitated  by  local  opposition  for  environ-
mental and health reasons, arbitrators also consulted
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  jurisprudence  in
interpreting the host states duties under the BIT with
respect  to  expropriations  and  nationalization.  This
approach was later followed by an ICSID tribunal in
Azurix v. Argentina  dealing with the interpretation of
an expropriation clause in the US-Argentina BIT ([62],
paras.  311–312).  The  Tribunal  agreed  that  the
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  provided  "useful
guidance" in interpreting the BIT.
In  Glamis  Gold  Ltd.  v.  United  States  of  America
[63]  Glamis  Gold  Ltd.,  a  publicly-held  Canadian
corporation engaged in the mining of precious metals,
submitted  a  NAFTA  claim  to  arbitration  under  the
UNCITRAL  Arbitration  Rules  on  behalf  of  its  enter-
prises  Glamis  Gold,  Inc.  and  Glamis  Imperial
Corporation for alleged injuries relating to a proposed
gold  mine  in  Imperial  County,  California.  Glamis
claimed that certain federal government actions and
California measures with respect  to open-pit  mining
operations resulted in the expropriation of its invest-
ments  and  denied  its  investments  the  minimum
standard  of  treatment  under  international  law.  The
California  measures  included  regulations  requiring
backfilling and grading for mining operations in the
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vicinity  of  Native  American  sacred  sites.  Glamis
claimed damages of  not  less  than $50 million.  The
Tribunal released the Award, dismissing Glamiss claim
in its entirety and ordering Glamis to pay two-thirds of
the arbitration costs in the case.
In this case, the Quechan Indian Nation submitted
an  amicus  curiae  brief  arguing  that  the  NAFTA
provisions  should  be  interpreted  in  a  manner
consistent with US obligations in treaty and customary
law to protect indigenous peoples' land and resources.
In general, the award contains many references to the
Quechan Nation, particularly during the course of the
factual  overview,  which  details  their  involvement  in
various  environmental  and  cultural  impact  assess-
ments. The backfilling and grading requirements were
imposed  by  the  state  as  an  attempt  to  strike  a
balance  between  the  need  to  protect  adjacent
Quechan  sacred  sites  without  imposing  an  outright
ban  on  mining,  or  even  more  excessive  costs  on
Glamis. The tribunal held that the economic impact of
the  state's  measures  were  not  sufficient  to  effect
expropriation of Glamiss investment. The respondent
did  not  choose  to  incorporate  into  its  defence  the
arguments  made  in  the  amicus  curiae  brief  of  the
Quechan Indian Nation. As a result, there is no refer-
ence to human rights claims or their incorporation into
the concept of fair and equitable treatment, either in the
respondents arguments or in the tribunals analysis.
In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al.
v.  United  States  of  America  [64]  the  company
comprised  by  Canadian  First  Nations  individuals
engaged in  the manufacture  and export  of  tobacco
products to the United States made a claim under the
investor–state provision of NAFTA, Chapter 11 against
the United States Government. The claimants argued
that  the  government  had  violated  the  national
treatment and most favoured nation treatment provi-
sions, as well as customary international legal stand-
ards  of  fair  and  equitable  treatment,  and  full
protection and security, which resulted in an expropri-
ation of their investment. The claimants invoked the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
customary international law, and the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in advan-
cing their claim that indigenous rights should be taken
into special consideration in a NAFTA Arbitration. In a
restrained decision the Tribunal found that while there
may  be  a  principle  of  customary  international  law
concerning fair and equitable treatment that requires
special  consultation  with  indigenous  peoples  when
their rights are affected, it was not applicable to an
individual investor ([63], para. 213).
In  terms  of  the  host  state  raising  human  rights
claims,  there  are  a  number  of  BIT  arbitrations
involving  claims  by  host  states  of  breaches  of  the
human right to water [65]. Many of these cases were
brought  against  Argentina,  while  a  few  involved
Bolivia  and  Tunisia.  In  each  case,  the  state  was
engaged  in  water  sector  privatization  schemes  and
the granting of concessions to foreign water corpora-
tions.  In  Suez,  Sociedad  General  de  Aguas  de
Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine
Republic  [66]  investors  were  claiming  in  an  ICSID
arbitration  a  breach  of  a  number  of  BITs  that
Argentina had entered into with their home countries.
The case involved a thirty year contract to manage a
water and sewage concession. Over the course of the
relationship a number of disputes arose and with the
intensification  of  the  Argentine  financial  crisis  the
parties were at odds over the tariff-rates charged to
consumers  and the  investors  wanted to  modify  the
rates  under  the  economic  equilibrium clause in  the
concession  agreement.  However,  Argentina  resisted.
The human right to water was invoked by Argentina
as  one  argument  in  its  defence  of  necessity  to  its
termination of the water concession, supported by an
amicus curiae submission filed by five NGOs (this case
is  the  first  under  ICSID in  which  such  submissions
were accepted in spite of the objections of one of the
parties).  In  general,  the  tribunal  emphasized  the
"defenses exceptional nature" and the strict conditions
surrounding its application ([66], para. 258) and re-
jected Argentina's defence because Argentina's meas-
ures in violation of the BITs were not the only means
to satisfy its essential interests and "because Argen-
tina itself contributed to the emergency situation that
it was facing in 2001–2003" ([66], para. 265).
The  tribunal's  evaluation  of  the  human  right  to
water  argument  is  relatively  brief  (quoted  in  toto
below) and occurs within its consideration of the third
condition for the defence of necessity, that the treaty
obligation does not exclude the necessity defence, a
condition Argentina was held to have met. Neverthe-
less,  it  emphasized  that  Argentina's  obligations  to
uphold human rights were in addition to their obliga-
tion to uphold their  investment  treaty commitments
and did not relieve them from those obligations:
Argentina  and  the  amicus  curiae submissions
received by the Tribunal  suggest  that  Argentina's
human rights  obligations to  assure its  population
the right to water somehow trumps its obligations
under  the  BITs  and  that  the  existence  of  the
human right to water also implicitly gives Argentina
the authority to take actions in disregard of its BIT
obligations. The Tribunal does not find a basis for
such a conclusion either in the BITs or international
law.  Argentina  is  subject  to  both  international
obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty obligation,
and must respect both of them equally. Under the
circumstances of  these  cases,  Argentina's  human
rights obligations and its investment treaty obliga-
tions are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutu-
ally exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argentina
could  have  respected  both  types  of  obligations
([66], para. 262).
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic [67] involved
a factual background similar to the Suez case and was
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a  dispute  over  Argentina's  refusal  to  permit  price
increases  in  the  context  of  currency  devaluation
brought about by the Argentine financial crisis and the
state's  eventual  transfer  of  the  water  and  sewage
service back to a state-sponsored company. As in the
Suez case, Argentina invoked the defence of necessity
based in part on its obligation to fulfil the human right
to water.
The human right to water, even though raised by
Argentina,  was  only  indirectly  addressed  in  the
majority's decision. The tribunal held that the state's
obligations  to  provide  water  were  encompassed  by
the  definition  of  an  essential  interest  which  a
defendant must prove has been imperilled in claiming
the defence of necessity:
[T]he term 'essential interest' can encompass not
only  the  existence  and  independence  of  a  State
itself,  but  also  other  subsidiary  but  nonetheless
essential interests, such as the preservation of the
States broader social, economic and environmental
stability,  and its  ability  to provide  for  the funda-
mental needs of its population. It follows that, in
addition to Argentina's overall stability, the need to
provide  the  population  with  water  and  sewage
facilities represented an 'essential interest'  which,
in regard to thousands of people, was to be served
by AGBAs concession and which would allegedly be
imperiled for them but for the acts of the Argentine
authorities ([67], para. 346).
Although the tribunal found that there was a grave
and  imminent  peril  to  the  essential  interest  of
Argentina's economic stability, it  ultimately held that
Argentina contributed to the crisis and thus was not
successful  in  invoking  the  necessity  plea,  with  no
further reference to the human right to water.
These  cases  do  not  exactly  indicate  the  robust
influence of human rights laws on arbitration proceed-
ings. Rather, the tribunals seem to be very cautious in
elevating  human rights  laws to  the same status  of
investment protections. Arguably the number of cases
reviewed is too small to draw meaningful conclusions
about a tribunal's potential influence over the power
residing with residual ownership. In some cases the
investor won and in some the host state won.
However, these cases do raise the important issue
of  the  propriety  of  addressing human rights  in  the
context  of  investment  arbitration  [68].  It  is  highly
likely that arbitrators trained in international commer-
cial law and most often acting for private parties are
neither  willing  nor  competent  to  engage  in  the
construction  and interpretation  of  human rights.  To
what  extent  would  the  situation  change  if  human
rights protections were to be incorporated expressly
into  the  BIT?  Can governance  gaps  be  filled  in  by
human  rights?  This  is  the  position  taken  by  John
Ruggie, former Special Representative of the UN on
Business and Human Rights, in the Guiding principles:
States  should  maintain  adequate  domestic  policy
space to meet their human rights obligations when
pursuing  business-related  policy  objectives  with
other States or business enterprises,  for instance
through  investment  treaties  or  contracts  (…)
Economic agreements concluded by States, either
with  other  States  or  with  business  enterprises—
such  as  bilateral  investment  treaties,  free-trade
agreements or contracts for investment projects—
create economic opportunities for States. But they
can also affect the domestic policy space of gov-
ernments. For example, the terms of international
investment agreements may constrain States from
fully implementing new human rights legislation or
put them at risk of binding arbitration if they do so.
Therefore,  States  should  ensure  that  they  retain
adequate  policy  and  regulatory  ability  to  protect
human rights under the terms of such agreements,
while  providing the  necessary  investor  protection
([37], p. 12).
The  Guiding  Principles  on  Business  and  Human
Rights advanced by John Ruggie carefully differentiate
between  the  legal  duties  held  by  states  to  protect
human  rights  and  the  social  responsibilities  of
business  corporations  to  respect  human rights.  The
distinction between legal duties and social responsibil-
ities, of course, reflects the operation of the doctrine
governing  international  legal  personality  and  the
limited persona of private business corporations under
international law, discussed earlier.
While,  International  Chamber  of  Commerce  op-
poses the inclusion of labour or environmental stand-
ards into BITs, and few BITs mention human rights
save perhaps in  general  terms in  the  preamble,  as
does  the  Dutch  Model  BIT,  some  model  BITs  are
moving  in  this  direction  ([9],  p.  614).  Canada  de-
veloped a new model Foreign Investment Protection
Agreement (FIPA), the Canadian equivalent of a BIT.
The  model  FIPA  embodies  changes  resulting  from
controversial  experiences  arbitrating  under  NAFTA
Chapter 11 investor–state provision. Controversy over
Chapter 11 arbitrations stemmed from the criticisms
advanced by environmental  and civil  society groups
that investment commitments under NAFTA negatively
impact  on  public  policy  in  a  number  of  areas  and
inhibit  sustainable development. Concerns about the
secrecy of the arbitral proceedings and lack of public
access  to  information  about  investment  disputes
motivated a review of NAFTA arbitrations by the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission which issued guidelines on the
participation  of  non-disputing  parties.  As  a  result
Canada and the United States agreed to open NAFTA
arbitrations to the public and have recently made the
draft  negotiating  texts  of  NAFTA  publicly  available.
The new model  treaty  addresses many of  the con-
cerns  expressed.  The  Canadian  Model  refers  to
sustainable development in the preamble and contains
a GATT-like general exception that applies to all the
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obligations in the model treaty [69].  This exception
covers measures adopted for the protection of human
animal or plant life or health and conservation pur-
poses. The Model also provides for public access to all
documents  and  arbitral  hearings  are  open  to  the
public. In addition, it  provides a procedure for non-
disputing parties to file written submissions. The US
Model  BIT  goes  further  and  addresses  relation
between investment and labour rights.
Whether  increasing  the  specificity  of  investment
agreements,  providing  for  public  policy  exceptions,
and efforts to render arbitration processes more trans-
parent  and participatory  will  enhance  or  undermine
the investor–state system is an open question, but one
that has major implications for the future of governance
through international investment agreements.
6. The Legitimacy of Private Transnational Gov-
ernance through BITs
This  paper  has  examined  the  centrality  of  the
investor–state regime to the regulation of the global
political  economy,  characterizing  the  regime  as  an
instance  of  private  transnational  governance.  The
regime  provides  for  a  highly  privatized  system  for
binding dispute resolution that significantly delocalizes
and denationalizes the laws and procedures governing
dispute settlement. It provides foreign investors with an
efficacious  system that  goes  a  long  way  to  enhance
certainty in international commercial contracting. 
The analysis also explores the political economy of
investment  agreements  and  suggests  that  contract
theory is analytically and theoretically able to tell us a
considerable amount about governance through BITs.
We  have  seen  that  international  investment  agree-
ments  function  to  create  an  institutional  framework
for  investor–state  relationships  by  providing  for
substantive  standards  of  behaviour  and  compulsory
dispute  resolution  that  address  credibility  problems
that  plagued  investment  relations  prior  to  the
emergence of the investor–state regime. In addition,
contract  theory  is  useful  in  explaining the apparent
paradox  at  the  core  of  the  regime  concerning  the
asymmetric distribution of benefits under investment
agreements. Incomplete contract theory indicates that
the  incentive  structure  and  distribution  of  benefits
changes over the course of the investment relation-
ship,  according  more  power  over  time  to  the  host
state as the owner of residual rights of control. At this
point the host is in a position to extract benefits from
the  foreign  investor  through  tax  increases  or  other
public policy measures that might open the door to
advancing human rights concerns.
However, the analysis also suggests that contract
theory  and practice  are uncertain  in  accounting for
governance by means of BITs, particularly when the
protection  or  advancement  of  human  rights  are  at
issue. Most BITs are silent on the broader regulatory
and  constitutional  functions  of  investment  agree-
ments.  Notwithstanding  this  silence,  such  concerns
have entered into debate through the submissions of
state  parties  to  investment  agreements  and by  the
business  corporations  affected  by  the  agreements.
Human rights concerns have also been raised in the
amicus curiae applications of non-parties and through
the  agency  of  arbitrators.  However,  arbitrators  vary
greatly in the strictness with which they interpret the
provisions of BITs and the extent to which they are
willing  to consider  the  impact  of  investment  agree-
ments  on  human rights  [50].  In  addition  to  differ-
ences in interpretive strategies and cultures, as Van
Aaken ([50], p. 528) notes, contract theory assumes
disinterested third-party adjudication, but conflicts of
interest and arbitrator bias are well-known problems
in  investment  arbitration.  This  raises  the  important
issue  of  the  proper  role  of  the  arbitrator.  Arguably,
most arbitrators regard themselves as acting for the
parties  to  resolve  specific  disputes  and  would
consequently  be  reluctant  to  engage  in  significant
public  policy debates. Clearly, their  competence and
legitimacy in doing so are also at issue [70].
Critics of the investment arbitration regime identify
a  shrinking  of  domestic  policy  space,  inflexibility  of
treaty  obligations,  lack  of  democratic  accountability
and pro-investment  bias,  secrecy and confidentiality
of  arbitral  proceedings,  conflicts  of  interest  and
arbitrator bias, forum shopping, and competitive pres-
sures that produce a race-to-the bottom in standards
[71]. Countries are beginning to defect from the re-
gime. Bolivia was the first to reject the ICSID Conven-
tion in 2007, while Ecuador withdrew its consent to
ICSID  arbitrations  for  dispute  dealing  with  oil  and
mining  contracts  and  terminate  a  number  of  BITs
[40]. Venezuela has denounced the ICSID Convention.
Pressure from civil society groups, including human
rights and environmental organizations has resulted in
significant changes in investor–state arbitration under
NAFTA, while Norway has integrated corporate social
responsibility and the protection of health, safety, the
environment,  labour,  democracy  and  human  rights
into its Model BIT. Asha Kaushal submits that these
are clarion calls  to roll  back the foreign investment
regime.  Countries  and  civil  societies  are  calling  for
restraint  of  foreign  property  and  contract  rights  in
favour of national sovereignty ([40], p. 495). To add
further fuel to the fire, there are studies suggesting
that  BITs  do  not  necessarily  encourage  foreign
investment or development [40,72]. Many believe that
developing  countries  are  bargaining  away  their
sovereignty for uncertain gains ([40], p. 519).
In  conclusion,  governance  through  BITs  has  an
uncertain capacity to advance human rights. Reorder-
ing  the  priority  accorded  to  private  and  public
interests in the investment relationship turns on the
ability of states to reclaim the public space that has
been traded off for the security of foreign investors.
This requires states to take seriously their legal duties
to protect  human rights in  investment relationships.
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Important, as well, is the balance that arbitrators are
willing to strike between private or public politico-legal
traditions in their decision-making. For the moment it
might be that the most that can be hoped for from
business corporations is  the advancement of human
rights through the gradual development of notions of
corporate social responsibility in investor–state relations.
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